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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GLEN FROYD and M. F.
BURGESS, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

I

vs.
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION,
a body corporate and politic; L.
V. Broadbent, as Mayor, and J. L.
Fakler, Frank Milne, Marion F.
Grames, Gail S. Seegmiller and
Haldow E. Christensen, as Councilmen of said City,

)

Case No. 7564

I'

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of the case as given by the appellants
is correct and the respondents, who are Cedar City Corporation and its Mayor and City Council will be referred
to as the "City", the Southwest Utah Power Federation,
as the "Federation", the Southern Utah Power Company
as the "Power Company" and the Rural Electrification
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Administration,· as the "R. E. A." in order that these
abreviations will be used in the same sense as the appellants.
The respondents agree with the statement of facts as
set out by the appellants with one additional fact which
should be made clear to the Court. The capital stock of
the power company is owned by Washington Gas and
Electric Company, a utility corporation now in bandruptcy in the Federal Court in and for the Southern District
of New York. Cedar City and the Federation have agreed
to purchase from the Court appointed Trustee for this
company, the common stock of the power company and
as to whether this can be consummated, along with other
related questions, are the questions to be decided by thif.J
Court.
In order to directly meet and answer the argument
presented by the appellants, the four points relied upon
by them will be discussed in this brief in the same order
except that it is felt that points ·number 1 and 4 of the
appellants' brief involve related legal principles and they
will therefore be joined for the purpose of argument. Following are set forth the points relied upon by the respondents:
1. The City, in agreeing to purchase a portion of
the common stock of the power cbmpany for the
purpose of participating in the dissolution and acquisition of its assets and becoming a member of the
Federation has not violated the Constitution for the
reason that the City is doing nothing in aid of another corporation or individual and for the further
reason that ·no public funds or credit is involved.

2. Cedar City has statutory authority to establish a municipal power system and the method
chosen is legal and in the exercise of the legislative
discretion of the City.
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3. The City has not delegated to anyone its rate
making power or power to determine the type and
cost of a municipal power system.
4. The plaintiffs can in no way be adversely
affected by the consummation of the proposed plan
and therefore have no cause to complain.

ARGUMENT
I

CEDAR CITY, IN AGREEING TO PURCHASE A PORTION OF THE COMMON STOCK OF THE POWER
COMPANY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATING
IN THE DISSOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF ITS
ASSETS AND BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE FEDERATION HAS NOT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION
FOR THE REASON THAT THE CITY IS DOING NOTHING IN AID OF ANOTHER CORPORATION OR INDIVIDUAL AND FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT
NO PUBLIC FUNDS OR CREDIT IS INVOLVED.
Specifically, the appellants contend that Article VI
Section 31 of our Constitution and also Article XIV,
Sections 3 and 4 will be violated by the consummation of
the power plan proposed by the City. As pointed out in
their brief and stateme·nt of facts, the city proposes to
purchase 11,305 shares of the common stock of the power
company, or 17.97% of the stock and the Federation
proposes to purchase the remainder or 51,605 shares and
amounting to 82.03%. Each of the two purchasers is
also having to pay the same proportion of the obligations
of the power company so that the total portion of the
purchase price to be paid by the city amounts to approximately $337,000. In order to raise this sum, Cedar City
proposes to issue Electric Revenue Bonds in the amount
of $375,000.00. In other words, the first step in the pro-
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posed scheme involves the purchase by the city of shares
of stock in a corporation.
Article VI, Section 31 of our Constitution would appear at first reading to prohibit this and which we also
quote:
"(LENDING PUBLIC CREDIT FORBIDDEN).
The Legislature shall not authorize the State, or
any county, city, town, township, district or other
political subdivision of the State to lend its credit or
subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any railroad} telegraph
or other private individual or corporate enterprise or undertaking.}}

It is obvious as the appellants state, this section can
be divided into two parts, (a) It prohibits any city from
subscribing stock in aid of any individual, corporate
enterprise or undertaking and (b) from lending its public credit in aid of any such individual, corporation or
undertaking. The city has no quarrel with the provisions
of this section and indeed can see its wisdom, but the
city strenuously contends that it has no application to
the present case.

A majority of our states have similar constitutional
provisions and the reason for them is very clearly stated
in 152 A.L.R. 495, as follows:
"Early in the nineteenth century it seems to
have been the general practice of states to encourage
the building of railroads by permitting the state or
subdivisions thereof to purchase stock in railroad
corporations, to issue bonds or lend credit in aid of
railroads, or to make outright do·nations to them.
However, due to the large number of insolvencies of
railroads, caused by fraud or economic conditions,
states and subdivisions thereof found themselves
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largely indebted and were themselves occasionally
insolvent because of large investments in such interprises. Therefore, a reversal of policy set in".
It might be added that cities have i'n the past donated

building sites for corporations and individuals and made
many other monetary inducements to them. This was
done by the expenditure of public funds raised primarily
from taxation. This practice is so manifestly wrong as to
leave no room to doubt the wisdom of such enactments
to prohibit it. But the proposed purchase by the city of
the capital stock of the power company most certainly
does not come within this prohibition according to the
general rule of law followed in the states where this
question has arisen and particularly as held by two decisions of this Court interpreting Article VI, Section 31 of
our Constitution.
In the first place, the purchase of this stock is only
preliminary to the main purpose of the purchase - the
acquisition of the physical properties of the power company after its dissolution by the City and the Federation.
Surely the appellants could have no cause to complain if
the city were to purchase the distribution system of the
power company, which even the appellants concede it
could legally do. But it seems that purchase of capital
stock for the purpose of enabling the city to participate
in the dissolution of the power company and the division
of its assets afterwards is vastly more irregular and in
fact is downright unconstitutional. It is obvious that the
plan to purchase the stock is only for the purpose of dissolution of the power company because the two purchasers, the City and the Federation had agreed September
23, 1949 as to the dissolution of the power company and
the division of its assets between them according to the
terms of the Dissolution Agreement (Ex. "B" · of Def.
Ans., Rec. 36-40) but the actual agreements for the purchase of the stock, (Ex. "A" of Def. Ans. Rec. 27-35) was
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not entered into until February 16, 1950. In other words,
the City and the Federation had already agreed as to the
dissolution and the division of the properties approximately five months before they even agreed to purchase
the stock. Therefore, it is obvious that the purchase is
only for the purpose of the dissolution of the power ·company and the acquisition of its assets - the destroying
of the corporation so its property can be obtained. The
majority rule in this country is that a purchase of corporate stock for the purpose of dissolution does not come
within the constitutional provisions similar to our Constitution as above quoted. The following cases so hold:
Brode v. Philadelphia 230 Pa. 434, 79 A. 659.
State Ex Rei Johnson v. Consumers Public Power
Distrist, 10 N.W.2nd, 784.
People Ex Rei. Murphy v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475.
Cawood v. Coleman 294 Ky. 858, 172 S.W.2nd. 548.
Long v. Mayo, 271 Ky. 192, 111 S.W.2nd. 633.
Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338.
McGuire v. Cincinnati, 40 NE.2nd. 435.
Most of the above cases are cited in 152 A.L.R. 512
where an excellent discussion of the question involved is
to be ·found. True, the court in the main case of the annotation, State Ex Rei. Johnson v. Consumers Public
Power District, supra, which held that the Nebraska Constitution was not violated, used the language of a purchase of all of the stock of a corporation but it is obvious
that the language was never inte·nded to mean that unless all the stock was purchased, the agreement to purchase only a part was illegal. What the Court did mean
was that the purchase of only part of the stock of the
corporation, leaving it operating as a going concern with
the government agency or subdivision being a stock-
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holder was within the prohibition which is as it should
be. But if the effect of the purchase is as in this case,
to immediately and simultaneously dissolve the corporation and render it defunct, it would make no difference whether the municipality bought only part of the
stock or all of it. In other words its co-purchaser is
joining with the dissolution. The net result of the purchase would be the same whether the City purchased
all of the stock or only part of it. Purchasing only part
of the stock and leaving the corporation to operate
could very well be "in aid" of the corporation but to
purchase all for the purpose of conjointly dissolving it
could not in the widest stretch of the imagination be
deemed "in aid" of the corporation but the exact opposite.
The reason for the rule that purchasing of stock for
the purpose of dissolution not being within the prohibition of our constitution is stated in the case of the State
Ex Rei Johnson v. Consumers Public Power District,
supra, as follows:
"Section 1, Article XI of our constitution was never
intended to prohibit a purchase by a subdivision of
the state of all the capital stock of a corporation
solely for the purpose of lawfully acquiring the physical property of such corporation for a public use,
constitutionally defined and lawfully authorized by
the legislature."
Also the case of People ex. Rel. Murphy v. Kelly, supra,
where the New York Legislature had passed an act allowing the cities of New York and Brooklyn to jointly
buy the Brooklyn Bridge by the buying of the stock of
the corporation owning the bridge, held,

"It was not the purpose of the act to make the City
of New York a stockholder in the bridge company or
to cause it to loan any money or credit to such comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pany. It was the purpose of the act to extinguish the
company and to vest all its property in the two cities
for a public purpose. All the money they paid for
stock or upon the debts of the company was simply
a furtherance of the purpose, to vest the property
of the bridge in the two cities and it was not to aid
the company or to make the cities stock holders
therein. The effect was to be the dissolution of the
company and transfer of the property of the company."
It is submitted that this case is directly in point with
the case at bar because neither of the purchasers purchased all of the stock but each only a part, but between
the two of them, all was purchased and for the purpose
of dividing and acquiring the physical property.

As pointed out above, the reason the courts hold
that a purchase of corporate stock by a municipality for
the purpose of dissolving the corporation and acquiring
its assets does not violate constitutional prohibitions
such as our own is because there is no "aid" to the corporation. It is not the bare purchase of the stock that is
intended to be prevented but the giving of aid to the
corporation by the expenditure of public funds.
There is another reason why the proposed purchase
of this stock does not violate our constitution and which
is one not found in any of the cases cited by the counsel
for either the appellants or respondents, which is that
public funds or credit are not involved in this case. The
very heading of our constitutional provision above quoted
"Lending of Public Credit Forbidden" shows clearly that
it was intended that the funds or mo·ney or credit to be
protected was· public funds raised from taxation or other
lawful means.
In other words, it is to safeguard the public treasury
and public funds and to prevent the use of such funds
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for such private purposes. As pointed out in 152 A.L.R.
512, supra a city could become insolvent or impoverished,
its credit ruined and deprived of its ability to serve its
citizens by unwise and costly financial ventures in aid
of other individuals or corporations.
But the money to be spent by the City for its portion
of the power company and consisting of the distribution
system in Cedar City, and also for future cost of maintenance and operation would not be the type of funds intended by the constitutional restriction. They are not
public funds in any sense of the word but are special
funds which in no way affect the tax structure, the
finance, credit or solvency of the City. A discussion of
the "special fund" doctrine should not be necessary in
this case. Needless to say, this court has adopted and
affirmed the special fund doctrine in a long line of cases.
See Barnes vs. Lehi City, 278 Pac. 878, Fjeldsted vs. Ogden City, 28 Pac. 2nd. 144, Utah Power and Light Co. vs.
Provo City, 74 Pac. 2nd, 1191, Utah Power a·nd Light Co.
vs. Ogden City, 79 Pac. 2nd. 61. Briefly the doctrine as
established by the above cited Utah cases and also by a
majority of the States of our union is that where the
money for the purchase or construction of an income producing utility or property comes from the sale of Revenue bonds, the payment of which and interest thereon,
together with all cost of operation, come from the gross
revenue received from the operation of the property or
utility, the funds involved are not public funds within the
meaning of our constitution and particularly Article XIV,
sections 3 and 4 which limit the indebtedness of our
cities, towns and counties. The right of a city or county
to issue and sell such bonds does not even have to be
submitted to an election by the people for the reason
that a public debt is not being created. Furthermore, the
cases of Utah Power and Light Co. vs. Ogden City, supra
and Utah Power and Light Co. vs. Provo City, supra hold
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that the large expenditure to· construct electric light
systems does not ·even have to be first noticed for bids
from contractors because public funds are not being
spent. Surely Article VI, Section 31 of our Constitution
in prohibiting the expenditure of funds for stock in corporations or lending credit has reference to public funds
from the public treasury raised by taxation or some
other legal method. The Provo City case gives an exhaustive treatment of the special fund doctrine and definitely shows that the expenditure of special funds has
nothing to do with taxes, credit or financial structure of
a city.
Nothing more will be said regarding the special fund
doctrine other than to state that so far as known to the
writer, no case cited by counsel for the appellants which
may have held that the particular spending or lending
under consideration was in violation of the constitutional provision similar to ours, was a case where only special funds were involved. In all the cases cited by counsel,
the funds were definitely public funds or general credit
of the political subdivision and coming from taxes or
some other source of general income and were not in
the category of special funds as are involved in this case
and as defined in the Provo City case.
Therefore, if the funds involved are not the type of
funds contemplated by our constitutional provisions
above quoted, then the whole prohibition must fall as
it has no application.
In fact it might be pointed out that the expenditure
of the funds involved could in no way adversely affect
the city's credit. The only conceivable way it could have
anything to do with the financial structure of the city
would be for the better. Of course the success of the proposed venture is not assured but surely the City expects
to make some profit from such an operation which would
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11
definitely improve the City's financial condition or enable the City to lower its tax rate because of the added
money.
As above pointed out, Article VI, Section 31 of our
Constitution prohibits the lending of credit of the City
as well as purchasing stock in a corporation and appellants claim that the credit of Cedar City is being le·nt to
the Federation and here we have a slightly different
proposition, but in any event there is no lending of credit by the City. In the first place no public credit of the
City is involved or in any way jeopardized for the reason
that only special funds are involved and the argument
above presented regarding the use of such funds for the
purchase of the capital stock would be applicable to the
lending of credit.
True, the Federation has tour other members besides
the City covering all of the Southern counties of the
State and to a minor degree in northern Arizona. The
generating plants and transmission lines of the Federation will be scattered and Cedar City is only the hub, so
to speak. Under the proposed plan, Cedar City would own
its distribution system outright, and the Federation
would have no claim to or lien upon it in any way. Likewise the holders of the Electric Revenue Bonds, whe·n
they are issued, would have no claim upon the distribution system. The City, however, would own no generating
facilities. It has heretofore decided it would be better to
buy its needs in power from a non-profit co-operative,
thus escaping the costs and hazards incident to generation. To do this the City has become a member of the
Federation and has signed a contract (Ex. "C" of Def.
Ans. Rec. 44) to purchase all power for a period of 35
years at a price of cost to produce the power. Since the
Federation is a non-profit co-operative, it can make no
profit but exists and operates solely for the benefit of its

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
members. True, the Federation has no money, but does
have an approved loan from the R.E.A. for $3,750,000.00
with which to purchase its portion of the system of the
power company and to make certain improvements and
extensions to the system. The Federation and only the
Federation has executed notes and mortgages on this
loan and at: no place is the city obligated to pay any part
of it. The only obligatio·n which the City has is to purchase all of its power from the Federation. The money
received from the City will of course be used by the Federation to pay its operating expenses and also to pay off
the R. E. A. loan and interest. Surely because the City
will be paying money to the Federation for kilowatts of
power, which money will then in turn be paid to the
R.E.A. on the loan cannot be termed an obligation of the
City to pay off the loan. To repeat, the only sums
which the City would be obligated to pay would be for
power delivered according to the terms of the wholesale
power contract, (Ex. "C" of Def. Ans. Rec. 44). If this
were determinted to be a le·nding of credit. or the assumption of a debt unlawfully, then every contract which a city or other governmental subdivision makes involving the
payme·nt to another for service or materials rendered
or delivered to the City is likewise illegal because the
money so paid would be used by the payee to either pay
off its own obligations or would go to expenses or profit.
'The assertion that the City might be obligated to pay
off the entire loan of $3,750,000.00 or perhaps even
$20,000,000. if the other members of the Federation or
the Federation itself went defunct, is truly remarkable.
This would appear to be a case of painting the worst possible picture, including matters so remote as to be beyond
the realm of possibility and then passi'ng it off as a true
likeness of the business transaction. This is impossible
because the only payme·nt for which the City is obligated
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is for the power consumed by its citizens and at a price of
cost to produce. Surely under the wholesale power contract the appellants cannot seriously contend that the
City would be required to purchase more power than it
could use, and this always at cost. If this is not enough
along with the purchase of power from the Federation
by its other members to pay off the loan from the R.E.A.
it may not be paid but even then the City could not be
jeopardized because its power system would be owned
by it outright and the Federation could have no recourse
to it.
It is interesting to note that appellants have cited
cases decided by many courts throughout the land in
which the question of lending of public credit was involved and particularly Constitutional or statutory provisions similar to Article VI, Section 31 of our constitution. These courts have construed and interpreted these
different provisions, but no reference is made to the
cases decided by this Court which interpret our own provision. This section has come before this Court twice
before, in the case of Bailey vs. Van Dyke, 240 Pac. 454
and Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 Pac. (2nd) 530. In both of
these cases, the court held that the public spending or
credit involved was not "in aid of" another corporation
or individual but was for a public purpose and benefit
and therefore, not within the prohibition.

In the Bailey case, the County Commissioners of
Weber County had entered into an agreement with the
Utah State Agricultural College and the U. S. Department
of Agriculture whereby Weber County would pay a portion of the salary and expenses of the Weber County Agricultural Agent who was to be in Weber County in the
program of the College and the Dept. of Agriculture. It·
was claimed that this was a lending of public credit. T!\is
court held, however, that so long as the contract a:·nd
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payment was for a public benefit and for the benefit of
the citizens of Weber County, that the Constitution was
not violated even if such an arrangement may have benefited the other contracting parties. This would appear
to be a case of a more direct benefit and aid to the other
parties than the indirect benefit possibly involved in this
'
case.
<I

In the Meiling case, where the Metropolitan Water
District Act of 1935 was attacked, this court held to the
same public purpose doctrine. Under the act and being
Chapter 10, Title 100, U.C.A. 1943, a group of small communities could form a water district for the purpose of
acquiring, developing and constructing water and water
sources for the joint use and benefit of all, and generally
doing what one individual city probably could not do
alone. The powers of the District as given by the act were
claimed to violate the Constitution on several grounds,
but in particular Sectio·n 18 of the Act, subdivision (G)
which allowed the District of which individual cities
would be the members, "to borrow money and incur indebtedness and to issue bonds or other evidence of such
indebtedness . . . . . . . "and also sub-section (K) which
allowed the District to "join with one or more other corporations, public or private, for the purpose of carrying
out any of its powers a·nd for that purpose to contract
with such other corporation or corporations for the purpose of financing such acquisition, construction, operation and therein obligate itself severally or jointly with
such other corporation, or corporations; also to secure,
guarantee or become surety for the payment of any indebted·
ness, or the performance of any contract or other obligation that
may be, or shall have been incurred or entered into by any corporation in which the district shall have acquired shares of stock
by subscription or otherwise . . . . . " This Court held that

the Constitutional provision above quoted was not violated a·nd said:
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"The purpose for which the broad powers are
granted the district are for the acquiring, developing and use of water for public benefit, and particularly for municipal and domestic uses by the inhabitants of the cities and towns which may organize a
separate district or join with the inhabitants of other
cities and towns in the organization of a single large
district. The section must be read and construed
with reference to the purpose of the act."
Therefore, it would appear that we do not have to
look beyond the decisions of our own Court to find what
the Constitutional provision relied upon by appellants
means, and these cases, along with the other cases above
cited should prove that Article VI, Section 31 is not
violated in any way.
The appellants also contend that Section 3, Article
IX of the Articles of Incorporation of the Federation
commits the City to pay future and contingent sums
and this obligating the City to lend its credit and likewise this is without merit. Admittedly, the wording
of Section 3 is at best unfortunate but it could not
be interpreted as meaning anything more than the
fact that the City will be obligated to pay for its
power purchased at a rate any different than as set
forth in the wholesale power contract. That contract
determines what Cedar City will pay and the rate
for the power, which is always subject to adjustment
and change in order to reflect the cost only, which
may vary. When Section 3, Article IX provides that
the City will pay for power at rates or on a basis
to be determined from time to time in accordance
with the bylaws (Articles), subject to contracts heretofore
or hereafter entered into between the City

and Federation

then it is clear that the contract determines the rate to
be paid. Furthermore, no other sums are to be paid as
an obligation by the City other than for power.
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Probably of least merit of any contentions made by
the appellants is that covered by point No. 4 wherein it
is claimed "The obligations assumed by Cedar City are
unconstitutional, violating Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4
of our constitution". There it is claimed that the above
sections which have to do with the creation of public
debt and limiting indebtedness apply to this case.
Attention should be called again to the type of financing and the funds involved in this case. The money
which the city intends to use to purchase its portion of
the power system would come from the Electric Revenue
Bonds. All of the money which the City expects to pay
to the holders of these bonds, all costs of operation of
the utility, including payment for power purchased from
the Federation, must come from the gross revenues received from the operation of the utility. This is provided
for in Ordinance No. 100 (Ex. "D" of Def. Ans. Rec.
48-61) and the City could pay no other monies. It would
be bound by the ordinance which was submitted to the
electorate of Cedar City under our Initiative procedure
and approved by a majority of a large vote. This ordina·nce definitely commits the City to pay all expenses of
purchasing the system and future operation and maintenance from the special fund created from the operation. No general funds or credits are in any way involved in this case~ Sections 3 and 4, Article XIV of our
constitution quoted and relied upon by the appellants
clearly have no application to this case. This court has
held numerous times that the above sections of our
constitution have no application to such special funds.
Some of these cases are Barnes V. Lehi City, Utah Power
and Light Co. v. Ogden City, and Utah Power and Light
Co. v. Provo City, supra. Therefore, this matter can be
dismissed as being entirely without merit.
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II

CEDAR CITY HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO
ESTABLISH A MUNICIPAL POWER SYSTEM AND
THE METHOD CHOSEN IS LEGAL AND IN THE
EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION
OF THE CITY.
The appellants concede that a city in Utah has statutory authority to build, purchase and own a municipal
power system, and Section 15-8-14, U.C.A. 1943 confers
this right. A great majority of the cities in Utah have
elected to have their own municipal power system. The
generating plants for some of the municipal systems are
of necessity outside the city limits and of course the appellants do not argue that a city may not go outside its
corporate limits for the purpose of ge·nerating power and
transmitting it to the city. Furthermore, it is also probably a matter of common knowledge that some of our
municipalities do not generate all or any part of their
power but they purchase it from some generating company at a wholesale rate and then distribute and sell it
retail to its citizens. As to which method is chosen is a
matter for the legislative discretion of each individual
city. Cedar City has determined to handle only the distribution of electric power and relieve itself of the increasing costs of generation. Over a period of years the
city will acquire an interest in the generating and transmission system of the Federation by paying into the
Federation money for its power. Appellants appear to
be greatly alanned that the City would in this way acquire an interest in generating facilities which may be
scattered and outside Cedar City. If the City could go
outside the city limits to buy or build generating facilities, there should be no harm in acquiring an interest in
those of the Federation with the money being spent for
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power. In other words, the City would be getting double
value for its money spent for power. This would appear
to be only good business and a matter for Cedar City to
legislatively determine instead of a legal problem for
decision.
Appellants rely upon the case of City of Phoenix v.
Michael, Arizona, 148 Pac. (2d) 353 as authority for
support of their argument that the action of the City
in respect to purchasing an interest in a generating
facility outside the corporate limits in connection with
the Federation is beyond the City's authority. That case
had to do with the expenditure by the City of Phoenix
from its public funds of a sum of money to a League of
cities in Arizona organized for the purpose of training
municipal officers ani also for lobbying in the State
Legislature. It was held that the City had no business
spending its money to do these two things and which
holding would appear only reasonable and therefore the
expenditure was illegal. But that case did not involve
the expenditure of only special funds for a power system
which cities in Utah may legally buy and own.
Appellants also seem to feel that Sections 15-7-6 and
15-8-20 U. C. A. 1943 which deal with a city's power to
contract for lighting of its city streets and public buildings and places is controlling upon the question of signing a contract with the Federation to supply the city
with power for 35 years. Those two sections limit the
length of a contract of street lighting and lighti'ng for
public buildings to three years, but surely appellants
do not seriously contend that these sections are i.n any
way applicable. It is clear that they only apply to contracts for public lighting and they have nothing to do
with contracts for the purchase of power or fra·nchises,
for that matter. Utah has no statutory or constitutional
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restriction or limitation upon the length of time a city
may grant a franchise or contract for services such as
contemplated in this case. This is confirmed by the case
of Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co. 93 Pac. 828. If
the cities of Utah were limited to three years in the
franchises they give or contracts for the purpose of
power or water, then practically every such fra·nchise
held by any company with a city in Utah is likewise
invalid as it is probably common knowledge that they
normally run many times three years.
III
CEDAR CITY HAS NOT DELEGATED TO ANYONE ITS RATE MAKING POWER OR THE POWER
TO DETERMINE THE TYPE AND COST OF A
MUNICIPAL POWER SYSTEM.
At the outset it is admitted that the power to make
rates for electric service or for that matter any utility
which a city may legally own is a power which cannot
be delegated by the City. Appellants contend that by
being a member of the Federation and agreeing to buy
power from the Federation at a wholesale rate subject
to change so as to only reflect the cost at all times, is
in effect a delegation of rate making power. Merely
because the Federation would set the wholesate rate,
which of course would go to the ultimate retail rate in
Cedar City would not be delegating to the Federation
the power to fix rates, however. If such were the case,
every city which buys power or anythi'ng else for resale
in the community by the City would be allowing the
seller of the electricity or other commodity to determine
rates. Of course the price a wholesaler charges a retailer
i'ndirectly determines what the retailer will sell the commodity for. This is an inescapable fact of our economic
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system. As previously stated, many cities in Utah own
their distribution system and purchase their power from
some private company.· The rate is set by contract and
of course that rate determines to a degree what the City
will sell it for. But this has never been considered as
granting to the power company the right to fix rates. The
city would stili fix that rate at any level it could otherwise legally do, considering all costs of operation.
Any city which owns a municipal power system and
generates its power has to buy diesel fuel or coal, unless
a hydro-electric system is in use, and the price paid for
the fuel oil or coal to a • certain extent determines the
price of electricity. It. would seem that additional argument is not needed to show that there is no delegation
of rate making power by Cedar City in this case but
attention should be called to two Utah cases which have
ruled on this point, Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co.
supra and Lehi City v. Meiling, supra..
Appellants have cited the Brummitt case to support
their argument that there has been a delegation of power
and that such is unlawful. This is indeed odd, because
the ruling of the Brummitt case definitely establishes
that there is no delegation of power in the case at bar
about which the appellants can complai'n. There it was
claimed there was an unlawful delegation of water rate
making power. The court held that the City of Ogden
had tried to illegally delegate its power to fix rates but
held further that since this was unlawful, the company
to which the delegation was attempted got nothing and
the City lost nothing and therefore the plaintiff had suffered no loss about which it could complai'n. Likwise,
if there is any attempted delegation of power in any of
the particulars set out in appellant's brief, such is not
legal admittedly but likewise the appellants have no
cause to complain.
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In the Meiling case it was likewise contended that
the Metropolitan Water District Act of 1935 allowed a
city to delegate to the water district power over city
finances and property and to interfere with city affairs,
but the court held that such was not the case and stated:
"Nor does the act provide for interference with
any municipal improvement, money, property or
effects. The power of control vested in the Board of
Directors is over the property, improvements, money
and effects of the district and not that of any of the
cities and towns whose territorial boundaries may
be coincidental with that of the district or included
therein."
As an answer to the charge that the City has delegated to the Federation the right to compel the city to
levy taxes in order to defray its expenses in the operation
or to pay off the R.E.A. loan, we only need to look at
Ordinance 100 which was adopted by Cedar City and the
voters of the city which definitely limits any expe·nditure
which the City could conceivably make to the gross
revenues received from the operation of the utility. Unless the ordinance is valid so as to enable the City to
raise its portion of the purchase price, then the proposed
transaction could not be consummated because the City
would have no money, and if it is valid, and it is not
under attack, it becomes an integral part of the entire
transaction. To repeat, the only money Cedar City could
spend is revenue from the operation of the power system
and the ordinance expressly binds the City and this can
be relied upon by the appellants and every other resident
of Cedar City as a protection to them against the evils
which appellants say will result.
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IV

THE APPELLANTS CAN IN NO WAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE CONSUMMATION
OF THE PROPOSED PLAN AND THEREFORE
HAVE NO CAUSE TO COMPLAIN.
As pointed out in this brief, the funds here involved
are special funds and not general or public funds, the
expenditure of which is stringently regulated by our
statutes and constitution. None of the prohibitions relating to the incurring of debts, advertising for bids for construction or pledging the credit of the city to pay off
obligations of others have any application to this case.
The appellants cannot and have not shown wherein the
consummation of the plan will take away any city funds,
deprive the city of its ability to perform its functions
or raise taxes in any way. They cannot show where it
will affect any person in Cedar City adversely from a
financial standpoint. For this reason most if not all of
the objections raised by appellants are disposed of. The
City contends that all elements of this over~all plan are
legal and within the power of the City but in any event,
because of the expenditure of special funds only, they
would have no cause to complain.
It seems that the appellants' main concern here is
not necessarily with the legality or illegality of the acts
of the City, but rather with the particular method
adopted by the City to achieve the result. The appellants
are objecting to the length of time granted in the wholesale power contract-35 years; they are objecting to the
fact that Cedar City, for 35 years is giving up its right
to generate its own power. They are objecting to the fact
that the City has tied itself to buy power from the Federation which serves rural areas when Cedar City might
be able to take care of its own needs at a cheaper rate.
They object to the fact that Cedar City will be a minority
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owner in the Federation and in many other particulars.
It is submitted by the City that the different acts and
contracts of the City are legal and are only the method
chosen to acquire and operate its own power system. The
City has decided that the method adopted was the best
one in the long run. It has therefore exercised its discretion in a legislative capacity and this Court is not concerned with the wisdom or folly of the plan. As pointed
out in the case of Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co.,
supra and also by Mr. Justice Elias Hansen in the case of
Utah Power and Light Co. vs. Provo City, supra, these are
legislative, discretionary matters with which the court is
not concerned. It may appear that the City could have
driven a harder bargain or that the agreements appear
to favor the Federation, but this is not enough to make
them illegal. On all these matters, the appellants cannot
be heard to complain.
Attention should be called to the Brummitt case
and the Lehi City v. Meiling case where the court held
among other things that the plaintiffs could not be adversely affected by the consummation of the scheme proposed. The Court, in the Meiling case observed that the
cities involved had not been called upon to do any of
the things it was claimed were illegal and beyond the
cities' power and stated that if, at some future date any
city was called upon to lend its credit or obligate itself
for any unknown obligation that such may be illegal and
if any plaintiff was to be aggrieved by the action, he
could then enjoin the City. The question is, can the
plaintiffs and appellants, i'n advance, champion the rights
of others as was refused in the Brummitt case, when
they have suffered no loss? As in the Meiling case, Cedar
City has not been asked to do any of the things appellants claim can be asked and which are illegal. The
proposed plan is as yet only on paper and has not been
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consummated. If at any future date, Cedar City might
be required to perform in any of the particulars which
appellants claim are illegal then the appellants could
seek to enjoin the City.
CONCLUSIONS
The appellants have the burden of pointing out
wherein the power plan contemplated by the City, or
some rna terial part, is illegal and beyond the powers
of the City and not merely the exercise of the legislative
discretion of the City.
The major objective of the City is to acquire and
operate the electrical distribution system of Southern
Utah Power Company within the corporate limits of the
City. In order to buy this portion of the company, whose
parents Company is in Bankruptcy, it has become necessary to purchase shares of common stock so as to participate in the dissolution of the company and the acquisition of the property it wants. Surely this is not such a
purchase of corporate stock as to be unconstitutional.
After the acquisition of the distribution system, the
City, instead of generating its power, which the appellants seems to feel it should do, intends to purchase all
of it from the Federation, a non-profit corporation of the
State of Utah and made up of other southern Utah users.
This company can make no profit but exists only for its
members. The appellants claim that by so becoming a
member, the City is allowing the Federation to make
assessments on the City for the payment of the loan of
the Federation. But the Federation has contracted, by
a special contract, with the City which governs any
payments to be made by the City and it is submitted
that this contract, not the Articles of Incorporation of
the Federation, which provide for alternate methods of
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paying for electricity, determines what the City will pay.
Admittedly the sums paid to the Federation for electricity will be used to pay off the indebtedness of the Federation incurred to purchase its properties but if this
is such a lending of credit to the Federation as to come
within our constitutional prohibition herein relied upon,
then it would be difficult indeed for any city to operate
and not violate it.
Further, all of the money to be spent by the City
will come from a special fund having nothing to do with
the city's credit, finances or solvency or tax structure.
The ordinance adopted by the City in of itself answers
most if not all of the questions raised by appellants as
all of them are either financial restrictions directly or
have their roots in the protection and safeguard of the
City's credit and indirectly the taxpayer. But if we are
not concerned with finances, credit of the city, or public
funds as intended by these constitutional and statutory
restrictions, then they most certainly are not applicable.
The appellants have not shown and ca-nnot show where
they will be adversely affected in any way by the consummation of the plan proposed because none of the
funds to be spent will affect them.
Lastly, the plan proposed has never been put into
operation. If at any future time, the Federation attempts
to claim the right to in any way force the City to lend its
credit, any citizen of Cedar City could then enjoin it. If
the City has attempted to lend its credit, which the
Respondents deny, then such is illegal and the City
could not be forced to perform and therefore, we have a
situation where the City or its citizens have given up
nothing and the Federation has gained nothing.
The appellants must go further than merely point
out remote possibilities. This is a large transaction involving a considerable area and a great number of
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people. It has been necessary to enter into a number of
contracts and associations in order to achieve the desired
result. If any parts of the plan appear to be unfavorable
to the City, they are of no concern to this Court if within
the power of the City or if the appellants will not be
adversely affected thereby. All of these parts to this
plan must be considered together as all are part of the
integrated plan and when the over-all picture is seen
and not merely isolated parts, its legality should not be
open to question.
Respectfully submitted,
ORVILLE ISOM and
LEROY H. COX,
Attorneys for Respondents
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